By Daryl G. Kimball | June 2026
After four weeks of tough negotiations and debate, the pivotal 11th nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference failed to reach consensus on a very modest outcome document that would have formally reaffirmed support for the treaty and the consensus decisions of the 1995, 2000, and 2010 review conferences.
The result was the third straight review conference that fell short of a consensus outcome. Although not unexpected, it was yet another very disappointing missed opportunity to reinforce the treaty’s credibility at a time of unprecedented nuclear danger.
The conference showed that rhetorical support for the NPT remains strong, but follow-through has been weak. As a result, the foundation of the NPT—the framework for global efforts to reduce and eliminate the world’s most dangerous weapons—is cracking due to inattention, intransigence, and ineptitude.
Conference President Do Hung Viet smartly pursued agreement on a draft outcome document that was relatively short but comprehensive. He invited states to show flexibility, focus on principles and practical actions, and avoid name-calling. Most states did so, several did not. In the search for consensus, he was forced to drop paragraphs on some important yet hotly contested issues. Some problems and some delegations defied such solutions.
Although no one state blocked consensus, a key reason it was not achieved was the U.S. insistence on including language saying, “Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,” and excluding language condemning the recent U.S. and Israeli attacks on safeguarded Iranian nuclear facilities.
Worse still, despite the best efforts of many non-nuclear-weapon states, the final draft document did not include specific or time-bound commitments to act on the treaty’s disarmament goals and objectives. This was mainly due to the obduracy and lack of ambition from the treaty’s five nuclear-armed states, none of whom can credibly claim they are complying with their NPT Article VI disarmament obligations.
For the first time since 1972, there are no agreed limits on the size of the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the world’s largest. There are no negotiations between any of the nuclear- armed states to limit or reduce their arsenals, and there is a serious risk of a dangerous, global nuclear buildup in the years ahead. At the same time, the norm against nuclear explosive testing is at risk due to inaction on ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by nine holdout states, including China, Russia, and the United States, and President Donald Trump’s threat to resume testing.
Sadly, the conference did not seize the chance to rectify the disarmament deficit. The NPT’s nuclear five methodically forced the removal of any passages that would have committed them begin “negotiations on disarmament” nor even to pursue discussions on an “urgent” basis. Instead, the final draft outcome document vaguely “calls on the nuclear-weapon States to engage in … constructive dialogue on the basis of mutual respect … and notes that such engagement could facilitate future arms control discussions, and help progress towards nuclear disarmament”
The exchanges at the conference also revealed the discord among the nuclear five on how and whether to reduce nuclear risks and nuclear arsenals. The U.S. delegation sought to focus attention on China’s nuclear buildup and said it had proposed “multilateral strategic stability talks” on “transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear testing.” Given the vagueness of the U.S. offer and the complexities of a five-sided negotiation involving states with different force sizes, force structures, nuclear postures, and strategic cultures, this could be a formula for further inaction on disarmament.
For their part, China and Russia expressed regret that the United States had failed to take up opportunities to negotiate a follow-on to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expired in February. They urged Washington to actively consider Moscow’s proposal to respect that treaty’s numerical limits for one more year and explore a follow-on agreement “in a responsible manner.”
To improve the chances of success in future arms reduction talks, whether multilateral or bilateral or both, and to prevent unconstrained nuclear competition, all five NPT-recognized nuclear-armed states should agree to a mutual and verifiable freeze of their strategic launchers at their current numbers.
One bright spot was that the vast majority of NPT states-parties insisted, over strong U.S. opposition, on retaining meaningful language in the final draft outcome document supporting the CTBT, strongly opposing the resumption of nuclear testing, and commending the treaty’s international monitoring and verification system. Also, at France’s urging, the U.S., UK, and French delegations issued a statement endorsing talks on “confidence-building measures regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, including increasing the ability to detect tests of any yield” to ensure that all states comply with the CTBT’s “zero-yield” standard before the treaty enters into force.
Repairing the imperfect but irreplaceable NPT regime and achieving real progress on disarmament is not optional. But it will take time, creativity, and smarter leadership from Washington, greater cooperation and restraint from other nuclear-armed states, and more focused and energetic civil society advocacy to get back on the path to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.
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