by Alastair Crooke
April 28, 2025
All of Kelloggās underlying assumptions lacked any basis in reality. Yet Trump seemingly took them on trust.
Political warfare in Washington is endemic. But the body count at the Pentagon has started to rise precipitously. Three of Secretary of Defence Hegsethās top advisors were placed on leave, and thenĀ fired. The war continues, with the Secretary now in the firing line.
Why this matters is that the Hegseth attrition comes amid fierce internal debates in the Trump administration aboutĀ Iran policy. Hawks want an definitive elimination of all Iranās nuclear and weapons capabilities, whilst many ārestrainersā warn against military escalation; Hegseth reportedly was amongst those warning against an intervention in Iran.
The recent Pentagon dismissals have all beenĀ identifiedĀ as restrainers. One of the latter, Dan Caldwell, formerly Hegsethās Top Adviser and an army veteran, wrote a post slamming the āIran Hawksā ā and subsequently was fired. He was laterĀ interviewedĀ by Tucker Carlson. Notably, Caldwell describes in scathing terms Americaās wars in Iraq and Syria (ācriminalā). This adverse sentiment concerning Americaās earlier wars is a rising theme, it seems, amongst U.S. Vets today.
The three Pentagon staffers essentially were fired, not as āleakersā, but for talking HegsethĀ out ofĀ supporting war on Iran, it would appear; the Israeli-Firsters, have not given up onĀ thatĀ war.
The inflamed fault lines between hawks and traditionalist āRepublicansā bleed across into the Ukraine issue, even if the faction membership may alter a tad. Israeli-Firsters and U.S. hawks more generally, are behind both the war on Russia and the maximalist demands on Iran.
Conservative commentator Fred BauerĀ observesĀ that when it comes to Trumpās own war impulses, they are conflicted:
āInfluenced by the Vietnam War of his youth ⦠Trump seems deeply averse to long-term military conflicts, yet, at the same time, Trump admires a politics of strength and swagger. That means taking out Iranian generals, launching airstrikes on the Houthis, and boosting the defence budget to $1 trillionā.
Hegsethās potential exit ā should the campaign for his removal succeed ā could cause the struggle to grow fiercer. Its first casualty is already apparent ā Trumpās hope to bring a quick end to the Ukraine conflict is over.
This week, the Trump team (including both warring factions, Rubio, Witkoff and General Kellogg) met in Paris with various European and Ukrainian representatives. At the meeting, a Russian-Ukrainian unilateral ceasefire proposal was mooted by the U.S. delegation.
After the meeting, at the airport, Rubio plainly said that the ceasefire plan was āa take-it-or-leave-itā U.S. initiative. The various sides ā Russia, Kiev and the European members of the ācoalition of the willingā ā had onlyĀ daysĀ to accept it, or else the U.S. was āoutā, and would wash its hands of the conflict.
The framework presented, as reported, is almost (maybe 95%) unadulteratedly that previously proposed by General Kellogg: i.e. it is his plan, first aired in April 2024. It appears that the āKellogg formulaā was adopted then as the Trump platform (Trump was at the time in mid-campaign, and unlikely to have been following the complicated minutiae of the Ukraine war too closely).
General Kellogg is also the likely source for Trumpās optimism that the ending to the Ukraine war could come with a click of Trumpās fingers ā through the limited application of asymmetric pressures and threats on both belligerents by Trump ā and with the timing decided in Washington.
In short, the plan represented a Beltway consensus that the U.S. could implement a negotiated end-state with terms aligned to U.S. and Ukrainian interests.
Kelloggās implicit assumptions were that Russia is highly vulnerable to a sanctions threat (its economy perceived as being fragile); that it had suffered unsustainably high casualties; and that the war was at a stalemate.
Thus, Kellogg persuaded Trump that Russia would readily agree to the ceasefire terms proposed ā albeit terms that were constructed around patently flawed underlying assumptions about Russia and its presumed weaknesses.
Kelloggās influence and false premises were all tooĀ evidentĀ when Trump, in January, having stated that Russia had lost one million men (in the war) then went on to say that āPutin is destroying Russia by not making a deal, adding (seemingly as an aside), that Putin may have already made up his mind ānot to make a dealāā. He further claimed that Russiaās economy is in āruinsā, and most notably said that he would consider sanctioning or tariffing Russia. In a subsequent Truth SocialĀ post, Trump writes, āIām going to do Russia ā whose Economy is failing ā and President Putin, a very big FAVORā.
All of Kelloggās underlying assumptions lacked any basis in reality. Yet Trump seemingly took them on trust. And despite Steve Witkoffās subsequent three lengthy personal meetings with President Putin, in which Putin repeatedly stated that he wouldĀ not acceptĀ any ceasefire until a political framework had been first agreed, the Kellogg contingent continued to blandly assume that Russia would be forced to accept Kelloggās dĆ©tente because of the claimed serious āsetbacksā Russia had suffered in Ukraine.
Given this history, unsurprisingly, the ceasefire framework terms outlined by Rubio this week in Paris reflected those more suited to a party at the point of capitulation, rather than that of a state anticipating achieving its objectives ā by military means.
In essence, the Kellogg Plan looked to bring a U.S. āwinā on terms aligned to a desire to keep open the option for continuing attritional war on Russia.
So, what is the Kellogg Plan? At base, it seeks to establish a āfrozen conflictā ā frozen along the āLine of Conflictā; with no definitive ban on NATO membership for Ukraine, (but rather, envisaging a NATO membership that is deferred well into the future); it places no limits on the size of a future Ukrainian army and no restrictions on the type or quantity of armaments held by the Ukrainian forces. (It foresees, contrarily, that after the ceasefire, the U.S. might re-arm, train and militarily support a future force) ā i.e. back to the post-Maidan era of 2014.
In addition, no territory would be ceded by Ukraine to Russia, save for Crimea which alone would be recognised by the U.S. as Russian (the unique sop to Witkoff?), and Russia would only āexercise controlā over the four Oblasts that it currently claims, yet only up to the Line of Conflict; territory beyond this line would remain under Ukrainian control (see here for the āKellogg mapā). The Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant would be neutral territory to be held, and managed, by the U.S. There is no mention made of the cities of Zaporozhye and Kherson that have been constitutionally incorporated into Russia, but lie beyond the contact line.
Nothing about a political solution apparently was outlined in the plan, and the plan leaves Ukraine free to pursue its claim to all Ukraineās former territories ā save for only Crimea.
Ukrainian territory west of the Dnieper River however, would be divided into three zones of responsibility: British, French and German zones (i.e. which NATO forces would manage). Finally, no American security guarantees were offered.
Rubio subsequently passed details of the plan to Russian FM Lavrov, who calmly stated that any ceasefire plan should resolve the underlying causes to the conflict in Ukraine as its first task.
Witkoff flies to Moscow this week to present this āpigās earā of a plan to Putin ā seeking his consent. The Europeans and Ukrainians are set to meet next Wednesday in London to give their riposte to Trump.
Whatās next? Most obviously, the Kellogg Plan will not āflyā. Russia will not accept it, and likely Zelensky will not either, (though the Europeans will work to persuade him ā hoping to āwrong-foot Moscowā by presenting Russia as the essential āspoilerā). Reportedly, Zelensky already has rejected the Crimea provision.
For the Europeans, the lack of security guarantees or backstop by the U.S. may prove to be a killer for their aspiration to deploy a tripwire troop deployment to Ukraine, in the context of a ceasefire.
Is Trump really going to wash his hands of Ukraine? Doubtful, given that the U.S. neo-conservative institutional leadership will tell Trump that to do so, would weaken Americaās āpeace through strengthā narrative. Trump may adopt supporting Ukraine āon a low flameā posture, whilst declaring the āwar was never hisā ā as he seeks a āwinā on the business front with Russia.
The bottom line is that Kellogg has not well-served his patron. The U.S. needs effective working relations with Russia. The Kellogg contingent has contributed to Trumpās egregious misreading of Russia. Putin is a serious actor, who says what he means, and means what he says.
Colonel MacgregorĀ sums itĀ up thus:
āTrump tends to view the world through the lens of dealmaking. [Ending the Ukraine war] is not about dealmaking. This is about the life and death of nations and peoples. Thereās no interest in some sort of short-fused deal that is going to elevate Trump or his administration to greatness. There will be no win for Donald Trump personally in any of this. That was never going to be the caseā.
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