February 13, 2020
Sinn FĂ©in, a nationalist party that sits with the left/far-left group in the European parliament and from the 1970s to â90s was attached to an armed insurgency in Northern Ireland, won the most first-preference votes in this monthâs general election in the Republic of Ireland. It now has about the same number of parliamentary seats as each of the stateâs traditional centrist âbig partiesâ, Fine Gael and Fianna FĂĄil.
This is an extraordinary development by any measure. However, with the partyâs vote and seat share sitting just below one quarter, and with âthe Leftâ in total, generously measured, stuck at not much more than 40% in votes and seats, it is not at all clear that it will lead to extraordinary changes in politics and economics here. Protracted negotiations, and perhaps another election, lie ahead.
Beyond the sensational fact that Sinn Féin, with its dangerous past and radical present, is the main beneficiary of the anti-establishment surge in this election, there is an unmistakable trend. The two big parties that have traded power in Ireland since 1932 have been seeing their combined vote shrinking, especially since the devastating crisis of 2008. In 2011, it was a dramatic historic low of 53%. Then in 2016 it dropped just below 50%. This time around, it is a mere 43%.
In 2011, Irelandâs Labour Party â a watery organisation even by the weak standards of European social democracy â was at the forefront of this resistance, gaining almost as many votes and seats as Sinn FĂ©in earned this time. Then Labour went into a governing coalition with Fine Gael, and in the last two elections it has been virtually wiped out. If it had stayed in opposition, perhaps it would have blocked at least some of the rise of Sinn FĂ©in, and benefitted from this yearâs bigger wave.
Instead, Labour sits sullenly near the bottom of the new, uncoalesced Left bloc in Ireland, consisting otherwise of Sinn FĂ©in; the Green Party, which has shared government with the centre-right in the past and is, by European-Green standards, relatively corporate in its politics and presentation; a loose historically-trotskyist alliance called âSolidarity â People Before Profitâ (S-PBP), some affiliated to the Committee for a Workers Internationalâs successor International Socialist Alternative, and others to the Cliffite International Socialist Tendency; various left independents (some formerly attached to those trotskyist groups); and the Social Democrats, a soft-left grouping that owes its 2012 formation in part to Labour renegades who left that party for reasons no one can remember.
All these groups owe their current relative success in large part to the fact that Sinn FĂ©in, not anticipating this yearâs surge, ran too few candidates, and their âsurplusâ transfers went very much to the Left, in Irelandâs complex voting system. These are disparate and often mutually hostile groups â the simmering tensions even within S-PBP, from the outside a remarkably stable alliance that delivers electoral fruits largely unknown on the ârevolutionaryâ Left elsewhere in Europe, are eased only slightly by victory. It is unlikely that all this Left will get it together to govern, especially since they would probably need the acquiescence of a motley assortment of mostly rural ânon-ideologicalâ independent members of parliament.
Meanwhile, the media in Ireland, almost uniformly hostile to Sinn FĂ©in, have suggested the partyâs victory came from the successful hiding of its âterroristâ past and radical/nationalist present â despite the same media âuncoveringâ these allegedly concealed things, repeatedly. In this formulation, the partyâs push for pragmatic solutions to crises in housing and healthcare was the source of its new success. There is clearly some truth in this, after an election campaign that focussed heavily on dissatisfaction with public services.
However, Sinn FĂ©inâs âpragmatismâ cannot and should not be read outside a larger ideological frame. Both of the old âbig partiesâ had been successfully remodelled in the neoliberal style in recent decades: Fianna FĂĄil, the party of the Celtic Tiger, drove an economic boom and bubble on a combination of financial speculation and multinational tech and pharmaceutical investment. Fine Gael decorated its post-crisis austerity policies in the rainbow colours of progressive change, adopting itself to popular referendum campaigns for marriage equality and reproductive rights; its outgoing prime minister, Leo Varadkar, is the gay son of a doctor from Mumbai.
By contrast to such models of neoliberal orthodoxy, and just as an example, Sinn FĂ©inâs spokesperson on housing, Eoin Ă Broin, is a long-time activist who has written books about âleft republicanismâ and about the role of neoliberalism and financialisation in the housing crisis. Like most in his party, he stands proudly outside the consensus view of what constitutes âpragmaticâ solutions to such crises. One shouldnât exaggerate their revolutionary socialism; in the European parliament, they sit on the right side within the left GUE/NGL group. Nonetheless Sinn FĂ©in, unlike the Irish Labour Party, are far from Blairite barely-social democrats.
Similarly, the Sinn FĂ©in partyâs stance outside the Irish stateâs consensual accommodation with British imperialism, including the partyâs insistence on a move toward referenda on Irish unity north and south of the Border, has almost certainly been less of an impediment than conventional punditry would insist. In fact, the Border-poll proposal is supported by the electorate far beyond the partyâs supporters. The outgoing government began the election having just been forced by popular outrage to abandon plans for a commemoration of the police and auxiliary forces who stood with the British against the Irish struggle for independence a century ago. Anti-imperialism is a force to be reckoned with in Ireland, where campaigns against US and British wars and Israeli settler colonialism are widespread and well supported.
Where, then, does ânationalismâ fit into the equation when we calculate the causes and consequences of political change in Ireland? And how do we discuss it without treating nationalist sentiment in a post and anti-colonial country as though it mirrored the nationalism of, say, Britainâs Brexit campaign?
We can begin to address these questions precisely by looking at Brexit in this election. A lot of the conventional wisdom from international pundits has suggested that Brexit was central to the result in Ireland. Within Ireland, the conventional wisdom goes the opposite way, supported by an exit poll that showed only 1% of the electorate saw it as the most important issue. Irish media generally say Brexit was irrelevant to voters, and that the outgoing government badly miscalculated by campaigning on it, with its focus on the competent handling of the negotiations leading up to Britainâs official exit from the EU on January 31st.
Both sets of conventional wisdom are probably wrong. Brexit played little part in the successful electoral drive of the Sinn Féin and the Left, but the spectre of Brexit should not be entirely discounted as a factor in the election.
The old government counted on the simplistic hope that Irish voters like to see their politicians âholding their ownâ and âpunching above their weightâ, especially vis-a-vis the British. Insofar as Varadkar and his team ensured that EU negotiators âstood up for Irelandâ to insist that there should not be a âhard borderâ between Northern Ireland and the Republic, the pre-Brexit talks could and should be counted as this sort of success, by their reckoning.
The trouble with this victory-lap approach was not simply voter âingratitudeâ for the governmentâs efforts â âEaten bread is soon forgottenâ was an oft-cited clichĂ© of the election coverage â but rather the inescapable fact that Brexit remains unresolved. The UK, including Northern Ireland, left the EU at the end of January, but apart from British officials losing their seats at Brussels confabs, nothing has changed â yet. In the week between nominal Brexit on January 31st and the election on February 8th, Irish news bulletins often featured an ebullient Boris Johnson vowing defiance of one EU demand or another for a future trade agreement, undercutting any sense of successful âcompletionâ.
Certainly the Irish government tried, in the election campaign, to have its Brexit cake and eat it too, crowing about its Brexit success but also warning that âit is only halftimeâ in negotiations, as an argument for continuity. Like most contradictory electoral messages, this was not a formula for success. It is arguable that continuing unease and even anger about Brexit and its as-yet-unknown Irish consequences were quiet influences on voters considering casting their ballot for Sinn FĂ©in.
In any case, âchangeâ was an easy message for Sinn FĂ©in to sell in a country that both badly needs it â in its appalling public services, particularly â and has also successfully delivered it in recent years. The party, like most other parties in the state, was actively involved on the winning side in the referenda that have marked the Irish people out as a particularly liberal and inclusive electorate. If we can vote for gay marriage â the first jurisdiction in the world to introduce it by referendum â and for legal abortion in an overwhelmingly Catholic state, then surely we can also vote for someone other than Fine Gael or Fianna FĂĄil.
However, it is clear that the electorate does not wish âchangeâ to take an anti-EU or anti-immigrant colouring, as it did in Britain in 2016. A number of new small parties and some high-profile independent candidates ran in this election on platforms rejecting immigration and calling, more or less explicitly, for âIrexitâ. They were roundly defeated, gaining no more than a few hundred votes for the most part, and âimmigrationâ was selected as the most important issue in the election by only 1% of people who answered the main exit poll. A Sinn FĂ©in candidate in the rural west of Ireland who had been targeted by anti-immigrant forces last year because of his support for asylum-seekers nonetheless topped the poll in his constituency.
In the continuing and complete rejection of any racist or neo-fascist Right, and in its turn to Sinn Féin and politicians further to the Left, the Irish electorate have offered powerful and unusual reasons to be cheerful about the politics of the new decade.
* Harry Browne lectures at Technological University Dublin, where he jointly coordinates the Centre for Critical Media Literacy.
Published at https://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/irish-voters-reject-the-right-a-new-opportunity-for-the-left/

