Art-of-the Deal Theatre or War? Ronen Bergman: ‘The Ayatollahs won the first round; Iranian regime not in danger’

A compilation tracking consequential & strategic observations on US-Israel-Iran — Analysis & reports from various sources (23 Jan 2026)

Conflicts Forum
Jan 23, 2026

Iran’s Inevitable War — The US’ Objective is not Reform, but Submission /

The Balance of Power in Iran Remains Solid; Security Apparatus is Intact /

Israeli Narratives — Ronen Bergman: ‘The Ayatollahs won the first round. Unclear whether there will be a second round’ /

Barak Ravid: “The Order Didn’t Come” — Behind the Scenes of Trump’s Decision Not to Attack Iran /

Ben Caspit: ‘A missed opportunity’ — Israel assesses Iran protest wave over /

Col. Doug Macgregor: ‘Iran knows what’s coming. They know Israel & the US are going to attack’ /

Might Trump and/or Netanyahu go nuclear in pursuit of an elusive Iran ‘decisive’ victory?

CONSEQUENTIAL & STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS —

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES — ‘War with Iran not abandoned; just postponed’

Iran’s Inevitable War — The US’ objective is not reform, but submission (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar, 21 Jan):

“In diplomatic exchanges with allies and regional powers, US officials are delivering a blunt warning to Iran: accept Washington’s conditions or prepare for a comprehensive campaign to dismantle Iran’s political system … Trump, faced with failure, is likely to escalate under his belief that power alone determines outcomes … Even Israel … is uneasy. Tel Aviv fears a long war with unpredictable consequences … Israeli officials insist on full partnership in planning and execution, convinced that they possess the deepest understanding of the Iranian file. Yet Netanyahu faces a dilemma: no one can guarantee control over a campaign driven personally by Trump. Trump, faced with failure, is likely to escalate under his belief that power alone determines outcomes. [His] conception of war is built around a fantasy of cost-free domination. He speaks of a “clean war” — one in which the US loses no soldiers and its military infrastructure remains untouched. He has instructed his generals to deploy an overwhelming force to eliminate both risks. Where intelligence fails, he believes firepower must compensate. In this logic, there are no red lines, no ceilings, and no political constraints …

At the core of the US-Israeli vision lies an ambitious objective: provoking an internal rupture inside Iran itself. Washington has been sending signals to influential figures and institutions that it is prepared to deal with any authority willing to meet its conditions, regardless of ideology. The only requirement is compliance. The goal is for Iran to become dependent, its economy tied to US leverage. Trump has gone further, attempting to entice potential successors with promises of regional and international influence.

Meanwhile, the military machine is moving. Since the latest alert phase, US forces have been preparing the operational theatre: large-scale deployments, heavy armament, and a tightening presence around Iran’s western and southern flanks, with eastern corridors activated if required. The build-up is centered on air and missile power, with naval forces assuming a growing role as a forward platform. Israel is expected to provide field intelligence, sabotage operations, targeted assassinations, and potentially direct combat participation. Inside Israel, there is little political hesitation about war. Security agencies are already operating … Israeli officials have signaled their readiness to absorb the costs, provided the campaign continues until Iran’s political system collapses. Israel has also offered to shield US forces by launching parallel operations in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen should Iran’s allies enter the war — a scenario Washington fears most. While Israeli planners claim confidence in managing these fronts, they have grown increasingly wary of strategic surprises.

Inside Iran, the leadership is operating on the assumption that the confrontation may reach its most extreme form. Preparations are unfolding along two tracks: strengthening defensive capabilities against a large-scale assault and tightening internal security to prevent domestic destabilization. This posture is now visible across the country. Urban and rural populations alike understand that the state views the moment as an existential test. There are no signs of serious currents within the system calling for accommodation with Trump. Even factions that once favored de-escalation now find themselves politically cornered. They understand that opposition to current policies does not translate into a desire for regime reversal, and that Iranian national identity is incompatible with external tutelage. Iran’s central institutions show no inclination to subordinate themselves to foreign power.

Crucially, Washington itself is not seeking a negotiated settlement. Many inside Iran are convinced that the objective is not reform, but submission — and that any alternative authority would be engineered to function as a client regime, no different from others across the region. In effect, Iran now stands in confrontation with the United States, alongside Israel and Europe. Yet Tehran has deliberately refrained from revealing how it would respond if war were unleashed. No one can reliably predict the scale or form of its retaliation. Comparisons with past confrontations are being drawn, but there is no certainty that old models still apply. Meanwhile, Iran’s allies and those who understand the catastrophic consequences of regime collapse in Tehran remain on constant alert. They know precisely when, where, and how to act, particularly if an imminent existential threat emerges against the core of the front resisting US dominance. With Trump, volatility is policy. He is prepared to reverse course within hours and escalate without warning. This is the pathology of empires in the late stage of power.”

Iran Confrontation Failed to Ignite. But war was not abandoned; just postponed (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar, 20 Jan):

“What began as economic protests in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar was quickly exploited and transformed into something far more dangerous … Intelligence reports reflected an organized, multi-layered protest map unfolding. Bazaar protest leaders soon recognized that the street had slipped into chaos. They formally withdrew and informed authorities that they bore no responsibility for the events. Reformist opposition figures further highlighted that the country was being driven into a trap. Israeli intelligence operating inside Iran and from Iraqi Kurdistan informed Washington that Tehran was regaining control rapidly and that the protest infrastructure was collapsing. The state moved quickly against rebellious groups in cities and provinces … In parallel, authorities launched a comprehensive cyber operation to track networks distributing footage across domestic and international platforms. They then imposed a near-total communications blackout …

The turning point came in Kermanshah. Iranian security services … uncovered an activated plan combining mass protests with armed assaults on state institutions. Police stations, civil administration offices, and emergency services were targeted. The objective was to create a high level of chaos and then seize control of the province’s civil and security administration centers. Authorities classified the operation as a foreign-backed military rebellion … The plan on the table was a combined military operation — air and ground — focused on Kermanshah. Its purpose was to dismantle Iran’s command structure in the province, impose an aerial blockade, and allow insurgent forces to consolidate control … As the containment campaign in Kermanshah intensified, authorities showed little tolerance toward other protest hotspots in different cities. They used special technologies to jam satellite transmissions, prompting insurgent leaders to appeal for foreign intervention. Israeli intelligence operating inside Iran and from Iraqi Kurdistan informed Washington that Tehran was regaining control rapidly and that the protest infrastructure was collapsing. This is where the war stalled … the US was not prepared for a full-scale confrontation. At best, limited strikes were considered to provide cover for insurgent advances. But Iran’s internal containment neutralized that option … Washington could not calculate Tehran’s response to any military attack. The risk was a regional fire. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey entered emergency consultations with the US administration, warning that the confrontation could spiral beyond control. All four countries refused to allow their territory, airspace, or bases to be used in any attack on Iran … This forced the US administration to search for alternatives to any potential military campaign. With no clear military pathway and no certainty over Tehran’s response, Washington was left with few viable options. The war was not abandoned; it was postponed.

The Balance of Power in Iran Remains Solid; Security Apparatus is Intact (Professor Narges Bajoghli, TIME Magazine):

“Revolution requires the alignment of institutions capable of challenging state authority—and right now, that alignment doesn’t exist in Iran … The 1979 revolution didn’t succeed because Iranians were angry. They had been angry for years. The revolution succeeded because three critical power centers aligned: the people, the clergy, and the bazaar merchants united against the monarchy … When those institutions moved together, the monarchy fell. The contemporary political landscape in Iran is fundamentally different … [The key point is] understanding the actual balance of power inside Iran and what would be required for meaningful change … Today’s bazaar strikes matter, but they don’t represent the same independent institutional power that helped topple the monarchy in 1979. The bazaar has been partially integrated into—or at least made dependent on—the very power structure it would need to oppose”.

[In terms of the Religious Establishment], the Iranian clergy is far from monolithic. Shia Islam’s clerical structure has historically been decentralized, with different ayatollahs, seminaries, and religious networks operating with considerable autonomy … Competing factions of the Iranian clergy harbor fundamentally different visions for the country’s future … This internal fragmentation matters because it means there is no single “Islamic Republic” to topple. There are competing power centers that might splinter under pressure but might also reconsolidate in unexpected ways.

Regarding the Army and the IRCG: Most critically, we have no evidence that the Iranian military is defecting. This is usually decisive … Today, Iran’s security apparatus remains intact, with the IRGC representing not just military force but economic and political power deeply invested in the survival of the Islamic Republic … Inside Iran, many civil society activists and political prisoners understand these power dynamics. They understand war would trigger intensified repression and set them back by years or decades … [and] that pursuing violent revolution would prove catastrophically destructive. They focused on sustained movement building and everyday resistance.”

ISRAELI NARRATIVES/PERSPECTIVES — ‘The Ayatollahs won the first round. Unclear whether there will be a second round’:

“The Order Didn’t Come”: Behind the Scenes of Trump’s Decision Not to Attack Iran (Barak Ravid, 18 Jan):

“On [14 Jan] morning, dozens of senior military, political and diplomatic officials in Washington and across the Middle East believed that an American attack on Iran was a matter of hours. But by the afternoon, it became clear that the order would not come, and everything was frozen … Trump had leaned toward supporting the attack. However, given the lack of sufficient military forces in the region, warnings from allies …, concerns among his senior advisers about the implications and effectiveness of the military options being considered, and the existence of a secret direct channel of contact with the Iranians – [Trump] has not yet pulled the trigger …

Although [he] first threatened on January 2 to intervene … it was several days before his administration began to see the protests as a potential turning point for Iran … The first senior White House discussion of a U.S. response took place [on] January 9 … Iranian FM Araqchi also contacted Trump’s envoy, Witkoff, to discuss a diplomatic path. A few days later, this channel would become a significant component of Trump’s decision-making process … [On 13 Jan eve] Trump entered the Situation Room for a briefing on military options … [however] at this point, it seemed that the violent repression was starting to have an effect and curb the protests. But Trump’s public threats created an expectation of action within the American establishment and heightened alertness in the region. Trump was presented with several military options, including strikes on multiple Iranian regime targets across the country from U.S. warships and submarines in the area … A senior U.S. official said that an attack plan was ready after Trump met with his senior team on [13 Jan], but the meeting ended without a clear order for execution.

[On] January 14: Trump back[ed] down: U.S. officials said that on [14 Jan] there was a serious expectation within the administration that Trump would give the “green light” to the attack. That was also the understanding in Jerusalem and other capitals in the region … “This was not a hoax or a hoax. This was a real event,” said a senior U.S. official. All eyes were on a crucial meeting Trump was set to hold with his top national security team [that] afternoon. But as the hours passed … the order did not come, according to U.S. officials, and after the meeting it became clear that the President had decided to delay the strike … In a call earlier [that] day, one surprising voice urged caution: Netanyahu. He told Trump that Israel was not prepared to defend itself against an expected Iranian response, especially given that the US does not have enough forces in the region to help Israel intercept Iranian missiles and drones. Netanyahu also believed that the current U.S. plan was not strong enough and would not be effective, one of his advisers said … [MbS] also spoke with Trump and expressed deep concern about the implications for regional stability, according to a source familiar with the matter … Several senior U.S. officials said Netanyahu’s warning and briefings from Trump’s team about the threats to U.S. forces from Iranian retaliation were significant factors in his decision … “We pretty much missed the window of opportunity,” said a source …

The Diplomatic Channel: Another component of Trump’s decision was the messages he sent and received through a secret diplomatic channel between Witkoff and FM Araqchi … On [14 Jan], Trump spoke to reporters … and revealed the message he had received from the Iranians. At that point, US officials said, it was clear that the immediate direction was to de-escalate … Trump acknowledged the messages he received from the Iranians played a big role in his decision. “It played a role, but it wasn’t the only reason. The president is guided by his superior instincts,” a senior White House official said … Although Trump has put off the strike for now, military action against Iran is still on the table. U.S. officials say another dramatic turning point could come again within weeks.”

‘The Ayatollahs won the first round. Unclear whether there will be a second round’ (Ronen Bergman, Yedioth Ahoronot, 21 Jan):

“Will he attack or not? … After all, he promised the protesters that help is on the way? … It seems that [Israel] has never stood with its eyes wide open and waited with such anticipation for the actions of the leader. But not its leader … when it comes to Iran – at least in this round – eyes are on Washington. It is certainly possible that Trump, who promised help to the protesters, will not want to turn away empty-handed and will do something … Quite a few Israelis said they were ready to absorb the Iranian bombing that would come, if Israel joined the campaign, for a limited time, and the main thing is that the evil regime there would fall.

Israel is tense … but not at all sure what is going to happen … There is still no clarity at the top of the country about what Trump is going to do … [The US] is keeping its cards close to its chest, and Israel is not sure when the announcement about what it is going to do will come. There is also no clarity in Israel if there is clarity in Washington. In other words – does the American leadership know the answer, does Trump really decide and we are watching deception upon deception … maybe he … only ordered the deployment of forces …

Last week, it seemed in Israel that Trump was going to attack on [14 Jan]. The Israeli system was trained … so that if Iran acts against Israel, it would immediately respond with a military strike, considering that a significant counter-response requires much longer planning and preparations. According to the [NY Times] Netanyahu asked Trump to postpone the attack a little until Israel’s preparations and defensive deployment were complete. Trump agreed. Since then, Israel has completed its defensive assessments, but the US has not yet completed its assessments, which will take another week and a half to two weeks …The Israeli assessment is that a small-scale American attack would result in a limited Iranian attack on an American target such as a military base … and not on Israel … From Israel’s perspective, it would have been better for the US to wait, take additional steps and preparations, and attack later, perhaps together with Israel …

[Israeli] intelligence sources [have] invested effort in assessing the [current] situation … According to the latest estimates and sources familiar with the material collected in Iran, a week and a half ago the protests reached their peak throughout Iran … [since when] the scale of the protests and demonstrations has decreased dramatically … The decrease in [protests] is so great that towards the end of the weekend, some intelligence analysts dealing with the Iranian issue estimated that … the regime’s victory was decided. In any case, the security establishment and the intelligence community do not believe that the regime is currently in danger, certainly not in immediate danger …

The central question is whether Trump missed the momentum — and if there was any momentum at all … [Nevertheless] suppose all the armed forces that the US is now transferring to the Persian Gulf were fully deployed … and suppose Israel were to join in with its firepower … Then what? Would they overthrow the government …? What is the optimistic scenario for such an event … without soldiers on the ground, but only air strikes? … Who would do it without the presence of ground forces, and how … especially after the June attack, from which the Iranians learned many lessons …? … In practice, such a regime has never fallen through external intervention …”

‘A missed opportunity’? Israel assesses Iran protest wave over (Ben Caspit, Al-Monitor, Jan 20):

“A debate is raging in Israel between those who believe the country missed a prime opportunity presented by the extensive protests in Iran to bring about regime change in Tehran, and those who argue that the days of the Iranian leadership are numbered regardless. “This round [following the December protests] is probably over, but the campaign is not”, a senior Israeli security official [said] … Netanyahu [has] warned that if the Islamic Republic attacks Israel, “We will act with might that Iran has not seen before” … “The Israeli military and air force have many surprises and capabilities that the Iranians have not yet experienced, and they really don’t want to experience them either,” the official added …

[However] Netanyahu’s decision to join Gulf states and other allies in persuading Trump not to attack Iran … has sparked heated debate. “The fact that Israel also took part in persuading [Trump] to postpone the attack will haunt us for generations,” a senior Israeli source [said]. “You don’t turn down such an opportunity … We have been dreaming for decades that America and the world will take the lead in the struggle against Iran, and when it happens, we prefer to wait. It’s simply unimaginable” … Despite disagreement over a missed opportunity, there is broad consensus in Israel that the recent protests were only the first of many rounds against the Iranian regime …”

Will Trump attack or not? (Ben Caspit, Ma’ariv, 23 Jan):

“In my opinion, even at this moment, Trump doesn’t know either. Of course, the accepted, authorized, and official opinion is that Trump will attack … A very powerful attack. Except that this is Trump … He is a businessman. In order to act, he needs to be convinced that he will benefit. That his goal will be achieved. He needs it proved that there are no unnecessary risks, that it [won’t backfire] … that in no case will he be a loser … and no one will laugh at him … No one knows what a powerful attack on Iran will produce. The elimination of the Ayatollahs could be a double-edged sword: lead to a revolution and democratization of Iran, or the opposite: the clerics will be succeeded by officers of the [IRGC], and the dictatorship will only worsen. We are making all the preparations … unprecedented defensive capabilities to the upper limit. According to foreign publications, we may be facing certain shortages. On the other hand, the Iranians have many more significant shortages …”

US PERSPECTIVES — ‘Iran knows that Israel & the US are going to attack’

Iran knows what’s coming. They know Israel & the US are going to attack (Col. Douglas Macgregor, transcript):

“Nobody in Iran is delusional. They know what’s coming. They know the Israelis and the United States are going to attack them. There’s no question in their minds. The only question is how does it begin? What triggers it? Nobody can say that with absolute certainty. Remember the last time around they showed up for talks with us and negotiations and in the midst of it the Israelis launched a surprise assault. This time around, I think the Iranians are going to be very prepared for all these possibilities … [General Keane has] said, ‘We had to bring in all this firepower.’ Because they thought they could get away with less. They thought they might be able to assist the forces on the ground trying to overthrow the government and that would not require as much military muscle. Well, that all fell apart. I don’t think the people in Washington recognize the extent to which they were delusional in their expectations, but now they’ve come around to understanding that you need a lot of firepower. So, you’ve got a lot more naval and air power involved. I’m sure we have some special ops on the ground, but I don’t think the special ops will be put at risk inside Iran in the way that we did it in Venezuela, because Iranians have a higher state of technology with which to defend themselves and alert themselves than was the case in Venezuela … The only question is one of timing …

Most people assume the goal is regime change. It’s not. It’s the breaking up of Iran into multiple fractious ethnic states. If that reminds you of the game plan for Russia, you’re onto something—it’s the same people gaming out our strategery. Now, what is this going to produce? Is this going to cause Iran to be destroyed? … Yes, they want to destroy Iran. Most of all, they want to destroy the government … They want to encourage Kurds, for instance, to come in, as they did a week or two ago, and try to incite trouble, incite rebellions. They’ll go into the Azeri areas again, I’m sure … [But] I don’t think it’ll work. I think the Iranian state will weather all of that, but I don’t know how they’ll weather everything else …

That brings us to the next question, which is probably the most important. Is everybody going to stand around and watch us utterly annihilate and pulverize Iran without interfering? I know that the Turks were involved in alerting the Iranians to the Kurdish group of fighters that tried–about 400 of them–to infiltrate into Iran a week and a half ago. I think the Turks have decided that while they may not like the Shia and the Iranian Shiites, nevertheless, they have no interest in seeing Iran be destroyed. What does that mean? Does that translate into anything? I don’t know … Russia’s very concerned about its southern flank. Is Russia willing to let this go down without interference? What about China? If this turns out to be as horrendous an attack as I expect, then I would think the Straits of Hormuz would be closed. The Chinese import about a third of their oil from the Persian Gulf. If that’s closed, the Chinese cannot stand around and twiddle their thumbs. So, we don’t know what precisely will happen. These are not going to be automatic responses, but at some point, decisions will have to be made about how much damage they’re willing to allow to be inflicted on Iran …

I think the Iranians are comfortable with their ability to deal with Israel. And that means that if they’re compelled to do so, they’ll level the place. Very little doubt in my mind about that. The problem is us [the US]. The Iranians don’t think they can handle us. Now, they’ll try, but the quantum leap from Iranian military power to American military power is just too great. So, that raises the issue, if they can’t deal with us, if they can’t survive us if we commit everything that I think we’re prepared to commit, will they get help? And where will that help come from? And I think that help could come from Russia and potentially China. But when under what circumstances, it’s hard to tell … [Trump] should make it abundantly clear to the world and to Israel that he’s not going to support a massive strike on Iran. But I don’t think he has that flexibility. I think he is hostage to Mr. Netanyahu. You have to go back and revisit the election. How was he elected the way he was? How did he get the support that he got and the money that he got? Keep in mind that his personal wealth, I’m told, has tripled over the last 12 months. What I’m trying to tell you is that the financial powers backing him also control him in this connection. I don’t think he has the option of refusing to participate …

It’s going to be very dangerous. My greatest fear has always been that the Israelis would use a nuclear weapon, because they’re the ones who’ve made it abundantly clear, ‘You push us hard enough, that’s what we’ll do,’ and they don’t give a damn what anybody else says, does, or thinks, and they’ll treat anybody that opposes that as an enemy … I think [Trump’s] expectation is that we will do much more damage this time around than we did the last time. In other words, we’ll be fully engaged from the outset. And that’s from what I’ve talked to sources in the region. That’s what they had hoped to happen in June [2025], and when it didn’t, that’s one of the reasons why they decided to accept the ceasefire that Trump is pushing … I think this [time it] will be a different ballgame. This will be much much more violent and much more damaging and much worse than anything we saw back in June [2025].”

Might Trump and/or Netanyahu go nuclear in pursuit of that elusive Iran ‘decisive’ victory? (Mark Wauck):

“The reporting still says [Trump] wants a guaranteed ‘decisive’ outcome. Nothing is guaranteed in war, so could that lead [him] to back out once again? Larry Wilkerson [explains] that ‘decisive’ is a military term of art. It means you’ve hit the enemy so hard they’re unable to respond. Most experts I listen to agree that we just aren’t in a position to deal a ‘decisive’ blow of that sort. The smart thing, [the] risk free decision, would be to just call it off. However, that consideration led Wilkerson to go on to speculate that Trump and/or Netanyahu might go nuclear in pursuit of that elusive ‘decisive’ victory. Wilkerson makes a somewhat plausible argument in that regard, since the longer Iran survives the less likely it becomes that Iran can ever be “dealt with” on terms that the Anglo-Zionist would find palatable. The best shot at regime change fell flat on its face, so would that not suggest going to nukes as the only way left?

I’m skeptical of the nuclear scenario for a number of reasons (and, yes, I’m aware of the earthquake in the Negev). How can any rational [person] possibly believe that it’s possible to destroy every single launch site in Iran—given that they are so well concealed and protected? The only way to even begin to do that would be via a massive ballistic missile strike … Iran, like Russia, has taken steps that assure its ability to respond to a first nuclear strike. That means that failing destruction of every single longer range Iranian ballistic missile, Iran will be responding by going after the Dimona nuclear site—to render Israel uninhabitable. And that would be just for starters. In the unlikely event that Israel survived, it would be an international pariah. And speaking of pariahs, the biggest of all would be Trump. IMO, resorting to nukes—even via a proxy Israel—would guarantee a midterm loss that would lead to impeachment. I strongly suspect that impeachment would lead to conviction. And don’t kid yourself—Trump is aware of that dynamic.”

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