In attempting to redeem the past, Germany risks compromising the very liberal principles that post-war Germany was built to defend.
Mastering Geopolitics
Germany’s commitment to Israel emerged from an understandable moral imperative: never again should antisemitism culminate in genocide. But over time, Staatsräson has evolved from a political commitment into something far more troubling—an unwritten doctrine increasingly treated as if it stood above constitutional law.
From moral responsibility to constitutional exception
Few countries have confronted their darkest chapter as profoundly as Germany. The Holocaust imposed a unique historical obligation that no serious observer disputes. Successive governments therefore made support for Israel a central pillar of German foreign policy, culminating in Angela Merkel’s declaration that Israel’s security forms part of Germany’s Staatsräson.
In geopolitical terms, Staatsräson (“reason of state”) denotes the doctrine that the preservation of the state’s fundamental interests and strategic identity takes precedence over ordinary political considerations. As Friedrich Meinecke argued in his classic study Die Idee der Staatsräson (1924), it is the principle that elevates certain national interests into enduring imperatives of statecraft. In Germany’s post-war context, the term has come to signify that safeguarding Israel’s security is regarded not merely as a policy preference but as a defining element of the Federal Republic’s political identity.
A democracy honours the victims of
history not by creating untouchable political doctrines but by
demonstrating that even its deepest moral commitments remain subject to
the rule of law.
The problem is not the historical responsibility itself. The problem is that Germany has gradually transformed it into blind support for Israel, no matter how many war crimes Israel commits, genocide, neighbouring countries’ invasions, colonial apartheid, and blatant disrespect for international norms and law. This fact places Germany in a critical, complicit situation, as all these are explicit in Israel’s law apparatus or public declarations by its leaders (president, prime minister, and ministers). The export of arms to Israel by Germany enjoys priority within the export clearance bureaucracy.
Staatsräson is neither a constitutional provision nor a statutory norm. It appears nowhere in the Basic Law. Yet it is increasingly invoked as if it were a superior constitutional principle capable of justifying restrictions on speech, academic freedom, and political expression that would otherwise be difficult to reconcile with Germany’s own constitutional order.
The latest illustration is the Hesse proposal endorsed by the Bundesrat, which seeks to criminalise denying Israel’s “right to exist” whenever such statements are deemed capable of encouraging antisemitic violence. The objective—combating antisemitism—is entirely legitimate. The legal method is far more problematic.
Germany is attempting to legislate around an idea that international law itself does not recognise as a defined legal category.
Legislating politics instead of law
The Bundestag’s own Scientific Service has already questioned whether such legislation complies with Article 5 of the Basic Law, which permits restrictions only through “general laws” rather than statutes directed at suppressing particular political opinions. Constitutional scholars, including Christoph Möllers (Humboldt University, Berlin) and Volker Boehme-Neßler (University of Oldenburg), have likewise argued that restrictions on political expression must satisfy the strict requirements of Article 5 and cannot be justified merely by reference to political objectives. These authors argue that such measures are difficult to reconcile with Germany’s constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression.
The difficulty lies deeper than constitutional drafting.
International law protects sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of peoples to self-determination. It does not recognise an autonomous legal “right to exist” belonging to states. Even supporters of Israel frequently acknowledge that the phrase is political rather than juridical.
Once criminal law begins to enforce political concepts rather than legal ones, constitutional certainty gives way to ideological discretion.
The danger is immediately apparent.
Expressions such as “From the River to the Sea” or questioning Zionism increasingly risk becoming matters for prosecutors rather than democratic debate in Germany. Whether one finds such expressions offensive, misguided, or politically unacceptable is beside the point. Liberal democracies distinguish between offensive speech and criminal speech precisely because constitutional rights exist to protect unpopular opinions.
Germany’s Constitutional Court made such an exception in the 2009 Wunsiedel judgment because Nazi glorification is inseparable from Germany’s own historical crimes. Extending that exceptional reasoning to an ongoing international conflict is a far more ambitious constitutional leap.
In effect, Staatsräson is being asked to perform the work of a legal principle it has never actually become.
The paradox: weakening Germany while strengthening antisemitism
The greatest irony is that this strategy may undermine the very objective it seeks to achieve.
Antisemitism remains a genuine and growing threat across Europe. It deserves uncompromising prosecution wherever it manifests itself through hatred, discrimination, or violence.
But suppressing political criticism of Israel for war crimes and deliberately killing children and women in Gaza, as widely shown by the press and human rights organisations, is not synonymous with combating antisemitism.
Indeed, conflating the two may prove counterproductive. When governments appear unwilling to distinguish between Jewish communities and the policies of a particular Israeli government, they inadvertently reinforce one of antisemitism’s oldest prejudices: collective Jewish responsibility for the actions of the Israeli state.
Meanwhile, Germany’s almost unconditional diplomatic support for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has imposed growing international costs.
Israel now faces unprecedented legal scrutiny before international institutions. The International Court of Justice has concluded that Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territories is unlawful and identified violations of international law, while UN bodies have accused Israel of grave breaches of humanitarian law. Germany has often found itself diplomatically isolated as one of Israel’s staunchest defenders, leading many observers abroad to portray Berlin not simply as an ally but as politically complicit in policies widely condemned across much of the Global South.
Whether one accepts that characterisation or not, the reputational damage to Germany is undeniable.
Instead of being recognised as a champion of international law—a role post-war Germany meticulously cultivated—Berlin increasingly appears willing to subordinate legal consistency to the political doctrine of Staatsräson.
That is precisely why Staatsräson has gone too far.
Historical responsibility should never require abandoning constitutional principles or being detrimental to international law or to another people, the Palestinians. A democracy honours the victims of history not by creating untouchable political doctrines but by demonstrating that even its deepest moral commitments remain subject to the rule of law.
Germany’s greatest post-war achievement was the construction of a constitutional order in which no political cause, however noble, stood above the Basic Law.
Staatsräson should not become the first exception.
I will finalise with some recent words of the Chinese Foreign Affairs spokesperson: “Certain European countries need to be reminded that blatantly applying double standards on issues concerning international law will only further erode their own credibility on the international stage.” Germany has already felt it with its defeat in the bid for a temporary seat on the UN Security Council.
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