By William Mallinson*
Athens, 1 April 2026
Recently, following a missile attack on the British base at Akrotiri, which reportedly caused damage to a hangar containing American spy planes, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides told the BBC that the British bases on Cyprus are a ‘colonial consequence’, and that talks on their status and future need to take place. He added: ‘When this unfortunate situation in Cyprus is over, we need to have a frank discussion about the status of the British bases and their future.’ Even Makarios refrained from expressing such views in public following Cyprus’ illusory independence in 1960. As I write this, NATO members, including Greece, are converging militarily on the unoccupied part of Cyprus, with aircraft, ships and soldiers. Iran is the pretext. Before drawing conclusions about Christodoulides’ unprecedented statement, a statement that AKEL would surely agree with, it is obvious that he made his statement to placate Cypriot voters. Let us look at some history, before concluding.
Anachronism
As early as 1964, following the outbreak of intercommunal violence as a result of a British-instigated set of 13 constitutional amendments[1], the Foreign Office wrote: ‘In the long term, our sovereign rights in the S.B.As will be considered increasingly irksome by the Greek Cypriots and will be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion.’[2] Then, following the coup against Makarios in 1974, and Britain’s inability to stop Turkey’s invasion, Britain tried hard to give up its bases, but Kissinger did not allow this. The following quotes say it all: ‘The US Government are now firmly attached to the view that withdrawal from our bases in Cyprus would have a destabilizing effect upon the Eastern Mediterranean, with implications for the Middle East. We do not believe that it would have any significant effect on Arab/Israel relations; its effect on the relations between Turkey, Greece and the Alliance would depend on the circumstances in which it took place. Dr. Kissinger in particular is anxious that we should ‘continue to occupy this square of the world chessboard; we do not any longer seek such a world role. Although our preferred policy is for a complete British military withdrawal from Cyprus, we recognize that we cannot do so at present, given the global importance of working closely with the Americans.’[3] ‘Given our decision not to use military force in Cyprus and the relatively small amount of pressure we can bring to bear upon Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, this puts us in the invidious position of having responsibility without power. This has brought us no advantages whatsoever and it must be in British interests for us to work for a solution which will not involve Britain in any guarantee obligations or other lasting commitments over Cyprus. Such a solution is however remote and will be particularly difficult to achieve as long as we retain a physical presence in the Bases.’[4] In 1977, A British Ministry of Defence paper stated: ‘ ‘Since it is unlikely that HMG would consider a military withdrawal from Cyprus while retaining sovereignty over the SBAs, any plan for a military withdrawal must take into account the need to transfer the sovereignty of the SBAs to the Government of Cyprus.’[5] British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal. Cyprus has never figured in NATO strategy and our bases there have no direct NATO role. The strategic value of Cyprus to us has declined sharply since our virtual withdrawal from east of Suez. This will remain the case when the Suez canal has reopened.[6]
Finally, however, in an about-turn, and contradictorily, Britain succumbed to America, just as she had over the Turkish invasion, as the following makes clear: ‘The benefits which we derive from the SBAs are of major significance and virtually irreplaceable. They are an essential contribution to the Anglo-American relationship. The Department have regularly considered with those concerned which circumstances in Cyprus are most conducive to our retaining unfettered use of our SBA facilities. On balance, the conclusion is that an early ‘solution’ might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), just as breakdown and return to strife would not, and that our interests are best served by continuing movement towards a solution – without the early prospect of arrival.[7]
Current Situation
In 1975, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote ‘We must also recognise that in the final analysis Turkey must be regarded as more important to Western strategic interests than Greece and that, if risks must be run, they should be risks of further straining Greek rather than Turkish relations with the West.’[8] Apart from new names and semantic gyrations, the situation is the same today, and even more so with the ill-considered US and Israeli attack on Iran. Thus the ‘British’ bases on Cyprus are vital, as are Souda Bay in Crete, Alexandroupoli and other bases in Greece. This has created the illusion in the naïve Greek government that Turkey’s importance to America and Israel has diminished in favour of Greece. Memories become ever shorter: not only did America’s Kissinger enable the Turkish invasion, but had already written as early as 1957: ‘But for the foreseeable future we should be able to count on […] Cyprus or Libya as staging areas for the Middle East, and on Great Britain as a staging area for Europe.[9] It is the same today, with America seducing the Greek government into becoming a gas hub for the Ukraine and a launching pad for attacking Iran. As for Turkey, Ankara knows that it holds the trump card with the NATO base at Inçirlik. Needless to say, the Turkish government is emphasising that the Inçirlik base is under Turkish control, and that Turkey wishes to remain neutral in the war. The supine Greek government would not dare to do this. Worst of all, Mitsotakis has now made Greece a legitimate target for Iranian missiles.
Most dangerous of all is that Greece has joined in the massive transfer of NATO military and naval assets to Cyprus. Former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis recently said that his country’s government only sent frigates and fighter jets to Cyprus to protect the United Kingdom’s bases on the island, rather than to protect the Cypriot people: ‘It is a pathetic situation. Our prime minister supposedly sent four F-16s and a frigate to protect Cyprus. In reality, he is protecting the British base there,’ he told Turkish newspaper Hürriyet. He added that the United States ‘is using that land to kill people in Gaza and Iran’.
Question and a Possible Answer
Under normal circumstances, Christodoulides’ statements go against Athens’ policy, particularly given the US-friendly Greece-Cyprus-Israel agreements. The question therefore arises as to whether there is another agenda, already agreed by the US, UK, Greece and Cyprus. It is well known that the US would prefer a two-state solution on Cyprus, with two internationally recognised states, whatever the lip service paid to international law and the failed policy of a bi-zonal federation. Turkey insists on a separate internationally recognised North Cyprus, in the knowledge that America needs Ankara more than Athens (viz. 1974), whatever the US-Greece love-in.
It follows that NATO would be strengthened by two new states in Cyprus, created outside a UN framework, albeit to Moscow’s anger. Hence Christodoulides’ ‘anti-colonial’ statements about the British bases. Under such an arrangement, Britain would give up her bases, Akrotiri to the Greek Cypriot state, and Dhekelia to the Turkish one. Under this arrangement, the two new states would join NATO. Double enosis would not be on the agenda, since Turkey would not accept her border with Greece extending to the South-West.
The Jewish State
As for Israel, a huge number of Israelis have left for Greece and Cyprus. This is logical, first because of the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance, a deepening strategic partnership focused on defense, energy, and security; and second, because Greece, unlike other countries, was the first after the last world war to set up an organisation to distribute to Jews properties of Jews who had died without heirs. The Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Israelites of Greece was founded to administer the properties. It allocates money to the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece. Who knows what financial arrangements are now being made to set up Jewish ‘states within states’ in Greece and Cyprus? As regards Cyprus, it is worth remembering that extreme Zionists claim Cyprus as part of Israel. According to AI, a major massacre of Greek Cypriots was reportedly committed by Jewish rebels during the Kitos War in 117 AD, primarily in the city of Salamis. Ancient sources, such as Cassius Dio, estimated that 240,000 Greeks and Romans were killed, resulting in laws banning Jews from living on the island, although some modern scholars suggest these figures may be exaggerated. What is certain is that the Jewish State needs Cyprus for its security, as Kissinger made so abundantly clear.
To Conclude
Behind the scenes, it is clear that the British bases which led to Christodoulides’ apparent outburst are now controlled de facto by the United States of Israel, bent on controlling Cyprus and Greece, possibly in a deal that will legalise the occupied part of Cyprus. International law is being thrown down the toilet. Athens does not have the courage of Ankara to play a clever balancing game.
* William Mallinson, a former British diplomat, is the author of, inter alia, Cyprus, a Modern History (Bloomsbury), Guicciardini, Geopolitics and Geohistory: Understanding Inter-State Relations (Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature) and, with Vassilis Fouskas, Cyprus 1974: Anatomy of an Invasion (Routledge).
[1] Although Makarios accepted responsibility for introducing the amendments, it was the Foreign Office that proposed the amendments, even helping Makarios with their drafting. See BNA/FCO 9/1353-WSC 1/1, in Mallinson, William, Cyprus: A Modern History, Bloomsbury, p. 35.
[2] Briefing paper, 18 June 1964, BNA-DO/220/170, file MED 193/105/2, part A.
[3] BNA/FCO 82/446, file AMU 3/548/8, part B
[4] ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, paper by Western European
Department, 11 April 1975, BNA/FCO 46/1248, file DPI/516/1
[5] DEFE 24/1525, file D/DS8/24/2, part 36, Group Captain Bliss (Acting Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee), covering note of 28 January 1977 attaching MOD paper
on the defence implications of an early military withdrawal from Cyprus (Annex A
to COS5/77).
[6] ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, draft paper, 11 April 1975, BNA-FCO 46/1248, file DPI/515/1.
[7] Minute from Fergusson to Foreign Minister’s Private Secretary, 8 December 1980, FCO 9/2949, file WSC 023/1, part C.
[8] ‘British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, paper prepared by Western European Department, FCO, 11 April 1975, BNA FCO 46/1248, file DPI/516/1.
[9] Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Washington, 1957, p. 165.
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